The Values in Violence: Organizational and Political Objectives of Terrorist Groups by Waugh, Jr., William L.
Conflict Quarterly 
T H E VALUES I N VIOLENCE: 
ORGANIZATIONAL A N D POLITICAL OBJECTIVES 
OF TERRORIST GROUPS 
by 
William L. Waugh, Jr. 
INTRODUCTION 
Terrorist violence, particularly in recent years, has frightened, 
attracted and intrigued academic, government and media analysts. 
The literature on the subject has expanded accordingly, albeit fre-
quently without offering fresh or useful insights on how the events 
should be interpreted. To some extent, however, analysts are now 
approaching the phenomena more systematically, with greater atten-
tion to patterns and processes in the events and greater recognition 
of the need to synthesize and expand interpretations of the meaning 
of the violence. 
The impetus, at least the most recent stimulus, for systematic 
event analysis has been the availability of the Mickolus dataset (IT-
ERATE) from the I.C.P.S.R. at the University of Michigan. Professor 
Jerome Corsi's article, "Terrorism as a Desperate Game: Fear, Bar-
gaining and Communication in the Terrorist Event" (Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 1981), for example, is one of the first of what promises to 
be a new generation of quantitative studies based on the Mickolus or 
other datasets (quite apart from Edward Mickolus' own studies). 
Martha Crenshaw's article, "The Causes of Terrorism" (Compar-
ative Politics, 1981), represents the second group of new studies, the 
integrative analyses. That second approach is the one utilized here. 
The hope is that the synthesis and expansion of interpretations of 
terrorist objectives will have some utility in events analysis, as well as 
in policy and decisionmaking analyses. Because terrorist objectives are 
crucial factors to be considered in the formulation of effective re-
sponse policies and the assessment of terrorist threats to government 
authority, the typology to follow is offered. The focus will be on what 
is called "transnational terrorism" by Milbank and Mickolus.1 
TERRORIST OBJECTIVES 
Paul Wilkinson has made two important distinctions concerning 
terrorist objectives. First, he has differentiated between organizations 
having broad "revolutionary" goals, incompatible with the existing 
sociopolitical order in the target society, and those having narrower, 
"subrevolutionary" (e.g., policy- or personnel-specific) goals, largely 
compatible with the existing sociopolitical arrangements.'- The dis-
tinction is crucial because terrorist organizations with "revolutionary" 
objectives present greater dangers to incumbent authorities simply 
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because they challenge the very basis of regime legitimacy. Thus, 
accommodation of their demands would be more damaging. The 
determination of the long-term objectives of terrorist organizations, 
then, is an important element in explaining and/or prescribing gov-
ernment response policies. 
Second, Wilkinson has also noted the necessity of distinguishing 
between the "long-term political objectives and strategies 
and . . . military strategies"3 of terrorist organizations. The suggestion 
that there are at least two levels of objectives sought by terrorist or-
ganizations is also important in that the differing levels may signal 
differing degrees of commitment to particular ends and even possible 
patterns (that is, priorities) in the terrorists' targeting strategy. Most 
importantly, the ultimate or ideological objectives of the terrorists may 
be less amenable to negotiation than would the lower-order objectives. 
Based on Wilkinson's suggestions, then, terrorist objectives should 
be recognized as representing different degrees of challenge to regime 
authority, based on the magnitude of change sought by the terrorists 
and as having differing levels of importance to the terrorists, based 
on whether they represent long-term or short-term goals. 
In terms of the distinction between long-term and short-term 
goals that Wilkinson offered, a further delineation can be made be-
tween the mid-range, strategic objectives sought by terrorists and their 
short-range, tactical (or military) objectives. Both refer primarily to 
the means which the terrorists are employing to achieve their ideo-
logical objectives. The tactical objectives are frequently articulated as 
demands during terrorist events and the strategic objectives are com-
monly the conditions sought as a result of the violence events and 
most often are not made explicit by the terrorists. 
Very briefly, the suggestion here is that terrorist objectives be 
considered to have three distinct levels: ( 1) ideological or ultimate aim 
[long-range], (2) strategic [mid-range], and (3) tactical or military [short-
range]. The categorization is roughly analogous to the objectives sought 
by governments in wars, campaigns and battles, even to the extent of 
the obvious overlaps in those strategies. The objectives are interre-
lated, not necessarily discrete, and generally hierarchical. 
Further distinctions can be made among the three levels of ter-
rorist objectives and among the specific objectives at each level; dis-
cussion of these distinctions follows. 
Ideological Objectives 
If terrorism is a manifestation of rational, goal-directed, behavior 
as many analysts4 suggest, some justification can be made for its use. 
Almost all terrorist organizations offer some ideological or moral jus-
tification for their violence, although the reasoning given may obscure 
more than it reveals about their intentions. Nonetheless, that "nor-
mative context," as it is called by Weisband and Roguly,3 provides the 
organization's members with personal vindication for their violent acts 
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and, by extension, determines the organization's "legitimacy poten-
tial," or its potential to attract mass support.6 
Apart from the previously mentioned distinction between "rev-
olutionary" and "subrevolutionary" objectives, the ideological orien-
tations of terrorist groups are extremely difficult to classify and have 
tended to be neglected variables in terrorism studies." There are nu-
merous reasons for that problem. First, some statements of ideology 
are unclear, which may signal the terrorists' unwillingness to expose 
their long-term objectives. Public support may be alienated by the 
expression of extreme or even, in some cases, moderate objectives. 
Weisband and Roguly (1976), for example, found that the ideological 
competition among Palestinian groups for members and support mit-
igated against more moderate positions. Strident rhetoric and high 
levels of violent activity seemed to attract greater interest and assist-
ance. Alternately, the target governments themselves may react more 
intensely and, possibly, more effectively toward the most extreme 
ideological groups. The uncertainty that is created concerning the 
terrorists' intentions may buy them time, from a government, and aid 
from the public. The success of the Provisional Wing of the Irish 
Republican Army (P.I.R.A.) in finding financial and moral support 
among Americans of Irish descent has been attributed to the P.I.R.A.s 
suppression of ideologically extreme positions in favor of anti-British, 
Republican positions. Similarly, the creation of satellite groups may 
be used to divorce the primary terrorist organization from more ex-
treme violence or ideological positions. Such seems to have been the 
case for the creation of the Black September Organization and its 
actions at the Munich Olympics in 1972. Thus, AlFatah avoided public 
criticism and a loss of public support. 
Second, the same reasoning may prompt terrorist organizations 
to deliberately misrepresent their intentions, to avoid the alienation 
of possible supporters and to curry favour from publics that would 
not be sympathetic otherwise. It is uncertain to what extent the P.I.R.A. 
misrepresents or downplays its long-term goals, but it is likely that 
the clarification of its goals would alienate some patrons. 
Third, the terrorist organization's membership may have differ-
ent long-term, ideological expectations. International terrorist organ 
izations, in particular, may have diverse, multinational memberships 
and constituencies that only share a few basic goals. Factionalism and 
fragmentation may result from any attempt to define the organiza-
tion's goals more clearly. That problem has been suggested as a reason 
for the singular focus of P.I.R.A. rhetoric and actions." Similar dif-
ficulties may explain the reluctance of other Western European ter-
rorist groups and coalitions of groups to define their objectives beyond 
the demands issued during joint actions. 
Fourth, some terrorist organizations may simply lack clearly de-
fined long-term goals, focusing instead on more immediate organi-
zational and political objectives. The Symbionese Liberation Army 
and other American terrorist organizations, including the Weather 
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Underground, seem to have little discernible ideological foundation 
other than vague statements of opposition to the present order. Much 
the same has been true of the more anarchistic and nihilistic Western 
European groups,although anarchism and nihilism, by their very na-
ture, may create the appearance of non-ideological orientations. 
Fifth and last, because terrorist organizations are vulnerable to 
the government's control or dominance of the mass media, their stated 
objectives may be deliberately misrepresented by their opposition. 
The media may be used to deceiving domestic and foreign audiences 
about both the terrorists' intentions and support. This can be a major 
problem for analysts who are forced to rely exclusively on the popular 
or government media for their data. Terrorists and guerrillas oper-
ating in the Third World face especial difficulties in publicizing their 
causes without distortion from government media manipulation. That 
may explain in part the selection of foreign targets by Latin American, 
African, and Asian terrorists and, perhaps, the choice to extend their 
campaigns of violence outside of their target nations — the choice to 
go international. 
In short, ideological objectives frequently are not clearly articu-
lated and, even if they are, are not easily fit into discrete categories. 
Moreover, analysts have noted a recent trend away from the tradi-
tional ideological bases that characterized post-World War II political 
violence and toward more nihilistic, anarchistic and ethnic bases.9 As 
a result, the typologies based on the ideological orientations of ter-
rorist groups have been awkward at best, often forcing terrorist groups 
into categories within which they share only the most superficial of 
characteristics.10 The eclecticism of the many Marxist groups alone 
suggests the difficulty in categorization. 
A more useful distinction appears to be that between the "ter-
ritorial" (nationalist, autonomist, and secessionalist, for example) 
groups and the "non-territorial" (anarchist, nihilist, and traditional 
ideological, for instance) groups. Indeed, movements for some form 
of self-determination, when genuinely representative of widespread 
opposition to government authority within a distinct ethnic, religious, 
or racial minority (or even majority), do seem to draw more support 
from domestic and foreign publics than do movements with less well-
defined land and population bases." The long struggles of the I.R.A. 
(and P.I.R.A.) and the Palestinian groups attest to their strong popular 
bases. That is not to say that all "territorial" groups have been or will 
be as successful in maintaining their struggles, however. To the extent 
that the "territorial" groups have greater "legitimacy potential" by 
virtue of their distinct constituencies than do "non-territorial" groups, 
they may have greater likelihood of success and many, therefore, pose 
greater danger to incumbent authorities. Popular sympathy can be 
translated into greater access to material and financial resources, more 
easily developed and maintained clandestine support structures (for 
example, weapons caches, hideouts, and staging areas), more highly 
developed and effective intelligence networks, and greater recruit-
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ment potential. The environmental constraints on "non-territorial" 
terrorist movements, on the other hand, can increase the burden of 
clandestine operations in terms of the expenditures of scarce person-
nel, material and financial resources. 
The decline (if not the extinction) of several terrorist organiza-
tions can be traced to the loss of personnel and support structures. 
The Baader-Meinhof group (Rote Armee Fraktion), the Tupamaros 
in Uruguay, and the E.L.N. (National Liberation Army) in Bolivia are 
cases in point. Of course, it can be argued that oppressive counter-
measures by the governments involved, rather than too little popular 
assistance, accounts for the decline of those organizations. Survivors 
continue the name, if not the operations, of each of the groups. 
In any case, in terms of the utility of the classification scheme, 
the "territorial/non-territorial" and "revolutionary/subrevolutionary" 
dichotomies should provide at least a starting point. The intermediate 
level objectives of terrorist organizations are more easily typologized; 
indeed, most have been identified in the literature already. 
Strategic Objectives 
Within the terrorism literature, six general, mid-range objectives 
can be discerned. They are: (1) organizational, (2) publicity, (3) pun-
ishment, (4) provocation, (5) disruption, and (6) instrumental objec-
tives. 
Organizational Objectives. Terroristic violence serves several functions 
within the terrorist organizations themselves. Intra-group violence 
assures discipline within the organizations by dissuading dissent, de-
fection, and laxness. Extra-group violence builds morale within the 
membership through the experience of cooperative operations, the 
feelings of elitism generated by strict discipline and sacrifice, and the 
shared excitement of dangerous and clandestine activities.12 The ter-
roristic acts also serve to "bloody" group members, initiating new 
members into the organization, testing members' nerve and commit-
ment, and cutting off escape routes back into society. The rites of 
passage reduce the likelihood of defections by supplementing the 
threats of organizational sanctions with those of societal and govern-
mental sanctions. 
Brian Crozier suggests that the use of terrorism within the or-
ganization is a good barometer of how much popular support the 
organization enjoys, with intra-group violence being indicative of low 
levels of external support.13 The history of the Japanese Red Army 
would seem to bear out that conclusion given the instances in which 
members have been executed by the organization, the lack of strong 
domestic support (and reliance on international connections and sup-
port), and the resultant strength of commitment of its members. 
The uses of violence outside of the organization have also been 
commented upon by terrorists themselves. Horst Mahler, a member 
of the Baader-Meinhof group, for example, stated that: 
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A fighting group can only come into being through struggle 
itself. All attempts to organize, develop and train the group 
outside the context of a real-life situation lead to utterly ridic-
ulous results—sometimes with a tragic outcome. H 
Much the same was stated by Carlos Marighella in the "Minimanual."15 
Training, discipline, and morals are built through the operations 
against perceived enemies. Marighella further suggested that orga-
nizational needs are also met through "expropriation." Extra-group 
violence is used to secure the necessary matériel and resources (e.g., 
weapons, ammunition, food, medical supplies and intelligence) to 
maintain the organization and to aid its operations. Thus, raids on 
gun stores and bank robberies are indications of impending terrorist 
activities, of a more political nature. Authorities in the U.S., for ex-
ample, have noted the potential for increased levels of violence after 
recent robberies involving the Weather Underground and the Black 
Liberation Army. 
Publicity Objectives. Publicity has been called the raison d'etre of inter-
national terrorism, but it is the basic objective (beyond organizational 
survival) of all forms of terrorism. Terrorism is a process of com-
munication designed to intimidate or terrorize targeted groups of 
individuals in order to alter their behavior and, concurrently, to elicit 
popular sympathy and support from domestic and/or foreign audi-
ences. In short, there are two distinct groups: (1) the public that is 
most directly involved in the violence as antagonists, and (2) the public 
that is only involved in the events as spectators (that is, the nontargeted 
public). The hostage-taking at the 1972 Munich Olympics, for in-
stance, lead to the deaths of eleven Israeli athletes, five Black Sep-
tember Organization members, and at least three other persons. Quite 
apart from the impact on the West Germans, the Israelis and the 
Palestinians estimates of the size of the international audience reach 
500 million persons16 and have led Richard Clutterbuck to contend 
that the violence was committed for the publicity alone.17 
The nontargeted audience can be a major actor or set of actors 
in terrorist events, particularly international terrorist events. For this 
audience, the violence is intended to arouse emotions, to break the 
inertia of noninvolvement in the conflict, to force action or reaction, 
to evoke admiration and fear, and to mobilize support. Violent acts 
demonstrate the strength and commitment of the terrorist organi-
zation and may, if ineffectively countered, encourage imitators.18 The 
greater the spectacle, the larger the audience, the better the effect 
will be. Hence, terrorists seek out targets which maximize their 
violencel9 and which help to cultivate and manipulate their relation-
ship with the information media. That knowledge of the important 
role of the media has already prompted a number of journalists to 
question their own roles in the events20 and government analysts have 
begun to investigate the relationship.21 The visibility given acts of 
violence against diplomatic, foreign business, and international targets 
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(such as airports and airline passengers) argues against the choice of 
lesser known or less important targets. 
Provocation Objectives. A large part of the task of attracting popular 
support for terrorist movements is gaining support from the incum-
bent authorities. Terrorists frequently seek to provoke an overreac-
tion to their activities from the government. Repressive counter-
terrorist operations, particularly when they affect the personal inter-
ests and freedoms of ostensibly innocent people, can undermine any 
regime's domestic22 and foreign23 support. The French Army's ov-
erreaction to violence in Algiers during the struggle for Algerian 
independence, the use of excessively repressive measures in Northern 
Ireland (such as the detention and search laws), and the Israeli gov-
ernment's reactions to violence on the West Bank and bombings of 
refugee camps in Lebanon are cases in point. Laying aside the possible 
justification or non-justification of violence and without debating 
whether one side or the other is 'right,' it can be argued that the 
countermeasures chosen by those governments are counterproductive 
to the extent that popular opinion and support were alienated. For-
eign, as well as domestic, support for the governments' action was 
affected negatively. 
More importantly, governments may be provoked to abridge their 
legally based guarantees of individual and collective civil liberties — 
possibly, to violate the very basis of their claims to represent legitimate 
authority and to reduce their own actions to the same level of "extra-
legal" and arbitrary violence as that used by the terrorists.24 The temp-
tation for governments to contravene legally sanctioned procedures 
in resolving domestic violence may be the most damaging consequence 
of terrorist activities. The military takeover of the Uruguayan gov-
ernment in the wake of Tupamaro violence in the early 1970s un-
derscores the dangers that overreaction may bring. In this specific 
case, it is not certain whether the Tupamaros will ultimately achieve 
their objectives when the military government is replaced. Domestic 
violence in other Latin American nations, such as El Salvador and, 
earlier, Nicaragua, has been met with government repression on a 
broad scale, leading to charges that the governments have violated 
human rights. Without judging whether the governments have acted 
justly or effectively, it can be claimed that their actions have called 
the legitimacy of their governments into question and estranged for-
eign allies and the loyal population. 
Punishment Objectives. Terrorist organizations may also seek to punish 
individual government agents and private citizens (foreign and do-
mestic) for failing to comply with or support terrorist demands. The 
imposition of terrorist sanctions against persons who fail to recognize 
the terrorist organization's authority and legitimacy demonstrates the 
strength of the terrorist organization. At the same time, it amply 
illustrates the failings of the incumbent authorities — 'heir impotence 
and their inability to maintain civic order and to provide basic public 
security.25 
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The "knee-cappings" perpetrated by the Red Brigades in Italy, 
the selective kidnappings and murders committed by terrorists (as 
well as government sponsored or tolerated "death squads") in Latin 
America, and the assassinations of government officials are preme-
ditated to influence the actions and loyalties of public officials and 
private citizens. Lenin called this situation, the competition between 
government and challenging authorities, the "dual power" situation. 
The objective of the tactic is to supplant state power by destroying its 
legitimacy and, additionally, turning the state's monopoly on the use 
of force over to the revolutionary group.26 The power to punish "wrong-
doers" and to "enforce" a set of laws or norms is associated with 
government authority. The ability of the terrorist organization to 
accomplish the same tasks indicates a major failure of the state au-
thorities. 
Disruption Objectives. Terrorist organizations may seek varying degrees 
of social, economic, and political disruption, ranging from brief in-
terruptions of regime or societal function to the total collapse of the 
social, economic and political structures of the target society. 
Disruption can be achieved through direct or indirect terrorist 
action.Bombings, arsons, shootings, kidnappings and other violent 
acts can directly affect the public's or the government's willingness or 
ability to carry on normal activities. If counterterrorist operations 
interfere with the public's routine activities, the same effect can be 
realized indirectly. In either case, the disruption may cause the po-
larization of popular sympathies.27 
T h e most serious consequence of terrorists' disruption efforts 
can be the collapse of the rule of law. In fact, this extreme objective 
has been implicit in the recent activities of nihilist and anarchist groups. 
Disorienting and terrorizing violence is utilized to break down the 
fundamental structures and images of social interaction, to undermine 
the stability of societal expectations, and, ultimately, to atomize soci-
ety.28 This would be an extreme consequence of terrorist violence, 
however. It is more likely that terrorist organizations will seek only 
as much disruption as will facilitate the achievement of their own 
long-term goals. T h e chaos that would characterize a complete break-
down of civic order might provide problems for the terrorists them-
selves with the lack of order producing other contenders for power,29 
just as disruption preceding the military takeover of Uruguay has 
proved, at lease for a time, counterproductive for the Tupamaros. 
Instrumental Objectives. Definitions of political terrorism frequently 
specify that victims are selected principally for their symbolic, rather 
than their instrumental, value.30 To a large extent, this is true. Ter-
rorist organizations most often launch their attacks against highly 
visible targets rather than targets having "military" value. However, 
military, police and government agents may have both symbolic and 
instrumental value. As collectives they are the authorities and as in-
dividuals they represent the authorities. By attacking such targets, ter-
rorists can damage the morale of the authorities, as well as of the 
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public,31 and demonstrate the organization's power and its potential 
to become a large-scale, military movement. 
The Italian Red Brigades' attacks on government officials, such 
asjudges, prosecutors and anti-terrorist force commanders, represent 
just such instrumental objectives. The kidnappings of Aldo Moro and 
U.S. General Dozier, on the other hand, reflect the conscious selection 
of highly visible and symbolic targets. Neither Moro nor Dozier rep-
resented a specific threat to the Red Brigades. 
If the terrorist organization is strong enough to carry out "mil-
itary" operations against "military" targets as a principal focus of its 
competition with the incumbent authorities, it is crossing the threshold 
from terrorist to military organization. Then the conflict with incum-
bent authorities can be more properly termed "guerrilla war" or "civil 
war," if conducted by indigenous forces, or external aggression, if 
conducted by nonindigenous forces. This distinction can be utilized 
as an argument for recognition of both the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization and the Irish Republican Army (Provisional Wing) cam-
paigns of violence as being military operations and therefore, despite 
the terroristic elements in each, more properly considered guerrilla 
warfare. Both organizations primarily choose military personnel or 
civilian authorities as targets. 
Instrumental objectives seldom provide the primary impetus for 
terrorist attacks,32 but the selection of targets with instrumental value 
by terrorist organizations is an indicator of the elevation of the level 
of violence and as such should not be ignored. 
It is clear that the aforementioned strategic objectives are not 
always separately pursued. Several strategic objectives may be sought 
with each act or threat of violence. Moreover, dozens of tactical op-
erations may be required for the terrorists to achieve the minimum 
goals sought or, occasionally, one operation such as the Black Sep-
tember Organization's attack at the 1972 Munich Olympics may achieve 
the desired effect. Mass destruction, even nuclear terrorism, could 
fulfill many of the objectives at once. Therefore, it is essential to assess 
the intermediate, strategic objectives of terrorist organizations in or-
der to determine what kinds of violence and how many deaths the 
terrorists might perceive as being beneficial to their purposes, as well 
as to determine what goals or demands the terrorists may be willing 
to negotiate. 
It is also important to note that all terrorist organizations do not 
have the same objectives. Some or all of these strategic objectives may 
be lacking, particularly among terrorist groups that have very limited 
or "subrevolutionary" goals. 
Tactical Objectives 
The specific concessions and the logistical gains sought by ter-
rorists in order to maintain or escalate their campaigns of violence 
and, ultimately, to realize their long-term goals seldom generate as 
much confusion as do their ideological and strategic objectives. Violent 
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acts are committed or threatened and demands are issued. Hostage 
incidents — i.e. kidnappings, barricade and hostage episodes, and 
hijackings — for example, generally have been conducted for the 
purposes of securing ransom monies or supplies, the releases of po-
litical prisoners, the publication or broadcast of terrorist propaganda 
messages, and/or the guarantee of safe passage or political asylum.53 
Armed attacks, robberies and break-ins, on the other hand, have 
frequently been used to procure supplies: weapons, ammunition, 
money, medical stores, explosives and food. In a few cases, armed 
attacks have been used to rescue imprisoned or detained terrorists 
and to create diversions. 
Purely destructive acts (assassinations, maimings, bombings and 
arsons), violence not accompanied by the issuance of specific demands 
or the expropriation of materials needed by the terrorist organization, 
may be more directly connected with the terrorists' mid-range or 
strategic objectives, such as organizational, punishment, and disrup-
tion objectives. Consistent with this view are the findings of Professor 
Corsi that governments were likely to concede demands issued by 
terrorists during hostage events and resist capitulating to demands 
issued in conjunction with atacks on specific and general targets.34 If 
the governments' willingness to accede to terrorist demands is pred-
icated on their perceptions of the dangers to incumbent authority, 
rather than to the lives involved in the hostage incidents, there may 
be more support for a hierarchy of values thesis. An analysis of in-
ternational hostage events between 1968 and 1977 conducted by this 
author35 did indicate that governments are more receptive to the least 
damaging demands (as publicity and safe passage) than they are to 
the more threatening demands for ransom and the release of political 
prisoners, nevertheless, it must be admitted the correlations were 
weak. 
These lower-order objectives may be no less threatening to regime 
authority than are the higher-order, ideological and strategic, objec-
tives, although they generally present less immediate risks to incum-
bent elites. Specific demands for safe passage or political asylum, for 
example, pose little direct danger to regime authority. However, it is 
possible that compliance with such demands, particularly when com-
pliance would assure the escape of an important terrorist, would en-
hance an organization's capacity to continue or expand its violence. 
The payment of ransom or the release of political prisoners, on the 
other hand, more clearly increases the risks to incumbent authorities 
both in terms of increasing the capabilities of the terrorist organization 
and decreasing the prestige, popular respect and legitimacy enjoyed 
by the government. 
In short, the tactical objectives of the terrorists usually will be 
more negotiable than their long-term objectives. Only a very weak 
terrorist organization or an organization with very limited, "subre-
volutionary" goals will be motivated primarily by the promise of small, 
immediate gains. However, that is not to say that stronger, "revolu-
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tionary" terrorist groups will not place a high value on immediate 
tactical goals. The risks that they assume in those operations attest to 
their valuation of short-term ends, but they may be more willing to 
compromise those goals if they perceive some advantage being gained 
for the attainment of their higher-order goals. 
SUMMARY 
In summary, this discussion is intended to suggest that terrorist 
organizations will place higher values on some of their objectives than 
on others and, to a large extent, those valuations will be ordered 
according to the levels summarized in the following table. 
TABLE: LEVELS OF TERRORIST OBJECTIVES AND 
SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES 
LEVELS OF SPECIFIC 
OBJECTIVES OBJECTIVES 
Ideological Revolutionary/Subrevolutionary 
Strategic Organizational 
Publicity 
Punishment 
Provocation 
Disruption 
Instrumental 
Tactical Specific Concessions 
Safe Passage or Political Asylum 
Publication or Broadcast (Publicity) 
Ransom 
Release of Political Prisoners 
Logistical Gains — Expropriations 
Destruction of Persons or Property 
Further, terrorist organizations will be more inclined to compro-
mise the lower-order goals than they will the higher. More tentatively, 
the suggestion is that the specific vulnerabilities and needs of each 
terrorist organization will determine its valuation of the listed strategic 
and tactical objectives. For example, weak organizations cannot hope 
to orient their attacks principally toward instrumental targets because 
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to do so would present too much risk to fragile organizations. For 
that reason, the organizations will tend to satisfy their more immediate 
and basic needs or goals first, namely, organizational and publicity 
objectives, before they attempt to satisfy the more risky, resource-
demanding, and resource-consuming objectives. If terrorism is a ra-
tional, goal-directed enterprise, terrorists will consider the limits of 
their capabilities and will formulate attainable goals. 
At this point, one is more hesitant to suggest that the strategic 
and tactical objectives of terrorist organizations can be arrayed in some 
sort of a hierarchical order, beyond the three levels. Much depends 
on the particular capabilities and weaknesses of the individual terrorist 
group. However, it may be possible to develop a hierarchical order 
of objectives for specific terrorist organizations. 
A further clarification must also be made. By assigning values to 
the particular strategic objectives there is an assumption of an esca-
lation ladder, dependent on the terrorists' capabilities. However, ter-
rorists' intentions may be much more limited. An organization with 
very limited goals might have little interest in maintaining or escalating 
its violence; indeed, it may be created for very shortlived purposes 
and, therefore, have no long-term organizational needs. On the other 
hand, while publicity has been identified as the fundamental strategic 
objective, terorists may be willing to compromise some of the publicity 
value of their violence in order to satisfy organizational needs or 
objectives. That trade-off may be implicit in the choice of violent tactics 
that minimize the risk to organization members and in the choice of 
tactics that do not maximize the impact of the violence. Anonymous 
bombings are not nearly as spectacular as barricade and hostage events, 
for example. Similarly, the use of bombs without shrapnel, as done 
by Cuban revolutionaries during the late 1950s, may satisfy the per-
sonal reservations about violence of the group's members. 
The difficulty in determining the goal priorities of terrorist or-
ganizations, as evidenced in the question of whether organizational 
or publicity objectives take precedence, is the most obvious reason for 
avoiding a hierarchical ordering of strategic or tactical objectives. 
Nonetheless, most terrorist organizations will likely place higher val-
ues on their organizational and publicity objectives than they will on 
their other strategic and tactical objectives. Ideological or long-term 
objectives, too, may be given separate and graduated values, but the 
two dimensions of ideological objectives mentioned here do not pro-
vide enough information to generalize regarding the form such basic 
value orientations will take. Again, valuations would have to be based 
on the specific needs and goals of each terrorist organization. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The importance of assessing the goals and value priorities, as well 
as the capabilities and strengths of commitment, of challenging ter-
rorist organizations, is clearly necessary for the determination of gov-
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ernment bargaining strategies. All terrorist threats do not present the 
same dangers to target societies and governments; therefore, there is 
no need to respond to all terrorism in the same way. The costs of 
unmitigated violence have to be assessed. Some societies and regimes 
are more resilient, less vulnerable to terrorist disruption and chal-
lenge, than are others. That resilience is a social and political resource 
that greatly increases the bargaining options of the incumbent au-
thorities and decreases the options of the terrorists. The response has 
to be tailored to the circumstances, just as the terrorists' objectives are 
tailored their organizational strengths and weaknesses. It is hoped, 
therefore, that the typology of terrorist objectives and the general 
structure of hierarchical values offered here can clarify some of the 
variables in the bargaining process. 
Unfortunately, the conclusions and suggestions made here are 
less amenable to quantitative measurement and analysis than re-
searchers would prefer. Ideological and strategic motivations of ter-
rorist organizations present a number of major methodological 
problems that will have to be resolved. However, if the analysis of 
terrorist events is to have some utility for policymakers, as well as 
researchers, the limitations of the present typologies will have to be 
recognized. At this juncture, particularly in view of the availability of 
the Mickolus dataset, it is important not to lose sight of the unresolved 
conceptual problems. As Professor Corsi noted, however, it is also 
important to continue to study the phenomenon of political terrorism 
and to offer analytic frameworks with sufficient precision and utility 
to inform and guide policymakers. It is hoped that this effect will 
expand the discussion of bargaining strategies and the measurement 
of terrorist threats to incumbent regimes. 
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